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PUNITIVE DAMAGES UNDER THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT: HAVE ARBITRATORS'
REMEDIAL POWERS BEEN CIRCUMSCRIBED BY
STATE LAW?
Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act' ("FAA") in
1925 to ensure that arbitration agreements would be given the
same legal effect as other contracts.' The FAA was designed to
overcome the great reluctance on the part of the courts to en-
force these agreements, and to promote arbitration., To advance
- 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1988). Section 2 of the FAA makes arbitration agreements as en-
forceable as other contractual provisions:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transac-
tion involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out
of such contract or transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
Id. § 2. Section 3 provides for a stay of court proceedings pending arbitration, and Section
4 allows a court to issue an order compelling arbitration. Id. §§ 3, 4: see infra note 9 (dis-
cussing sections 3 and 4 of FAA). Section 10 of the FAA provides specific instances where
an arbitrator's award may be vacated by a district court. 9 U.S.C. § 10; infra note 10 (quot-
ing section 10 of FAA).
See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., I I S. Ct. 1647, 1651 (1991) (FAA en-
acted to put arbitration agreements "upon the same footing" as other legal contracts); Volt
Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 474 (1989) (FAA created " 'to overrule the judiciary's longstanding refusal to
enforce agreements to arbitrate' " (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S.
213, 219-20 (1985)) and to " 'place such agreements upon the same footing as other con-
tracts'" (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974) (quoting H.R.
REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1924))); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967) (same); see also MARTINE DOMKE, COMMERCIAl.
ARBITRATION § 4:03 (1990) (FAA provides that arbitration agreements shall be enforceable
to same extent as other contracts): Barbara Ann Atwood, Issues in Federal-State Relations
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 61, 66 (1985) (same).
' See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13 (1984). Congress faced two problems
when enacting the FAA: the hostility of courts toward arbitration and the failure of state
legislatures to mandate enforcement of arbitration agreements. Id.; Gilmer, I Il S. Ct. at
1651. The purpose of the FAA was to reverse the longstanding trend of judicial hostility
that the American courts adopted from the English common law. See S. REP. No. 536, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1924) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]: H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1-2 (1924) [hereinafter HousE REPORT]- Joint Hearings on 5.1005 and H.R. 646 Before
the Subcomm. of the Committees on the Judiciary, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1924) [hereinaf-
ter Joint Hearings] (remarks of Julius Cohen). The Senate Report cited as a reason for the
hostility to arbitration enforcement, "Itlhe courts' jealousy of their rights as courts, cou-
pled with the fear that if arbitration agreements were to prevail and be enforced, the
courts would be ousted of much of their jurisdiction." SENATE REPORT, supra, at 2-3: see
also DOMKE, supra note 2, § 3:01 (stating reason for courts' reluctance to enforce arbitra-
tion agreements); Douglas M. Fox, Preemption Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 15 U. BALT.
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these goals courts have restricted judicial review of arbitration
awards." Because the FAA was not endowed with an independent
basis of jurisdiction, parties who want to compel arbitration under
the FAA in federal court must rely upon diversity of citizenship.'
When diversity jurisdiction is invoked, courts must generally apply
state substantive law." However, courts have interpreted the FAA
as creating a body of federal substantive law which may therefore
preempt conflicting state law.' Recently, a split in the circuits has
developed concerning the preemptability of state law provisions
which prohibit an arbitrator's award of punitive damages.'
L. REV. 129, 130 (1985-86) (majority of courts at common law refused to enforce arbitra-
tion agreements because of jealousy and quest for prestige); Linda R. Hirshman, The Second
Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305, 1310 (1985)
(courts refused to recognize arbitration agreements as legally binding obligations).
" See infra text accompanying notes 19-28 (Supreme Court's broad interpretation of
FAA).
* See infra note 13 and accompanying text (FAA's basis of jurisdiction).
' See infra notes 10-12 and accompanying text (narrow review of arbitration awards).
7 See discussion infra part 11 (discussing preemption of state procedural and substantive
law).
8 See discussion infra parts II, II1 (discussing relevant circuit court decisions on issue of
preemption of state substantive law which prohibited awards of punitive damages).
For the first notable use of punitive damages in America, see Coryell v. Colbaugh, I N.J.
77, 79 (1791) (awarding punitive damages for breach of promise to marry "for examples
sake"). Since the first application of punitive damages by American courts, the guidelines
under which such damages have been imposed vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See,
e.g., Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 443 (5th Cir. 1962)
(Gewin, J., concurring). "The term [punitive damages] is too loose, vague, indefinite, and
uncertain; and its meaning often varies from state to state, court to court, and jury to jury.
It is a chameleon of the law-changing its hue to the color of the situation on which it may
be used." Id.: see also John D. Long, Punitive Damages: An Unsettled Doctrine, 25 DRAKE L.
REV. 870, 879, 881 (1976) (giving examples of various states' conduct requirements ranging
from "oppression, fraud, or malice" to "mere caprice").
Subsequent case history in the United States has delineated four basic motives in grant-
ing such an award. The first motive is to deter the wrongdoer and to punish outrageous
conduct. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266 (1981) (goal is to
punish tortfeasor and deter others from similar conduct); International Bhd. of Elec.
Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 48 (1979) (same); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 350 (1974) (punitive damages "are private fines levied by civil juries to punish repre-
hensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence"); see also RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF
TORTS § 908 (1) (1965). "Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory or nom-
inal damages, awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct and to
deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the future." Id.
Other courts cite public justice as a motive. See Philip H. Corboy, Should Punitive Dam-
ages Be Abolished? A Statement for the Negative, A.B.A. SEC. ON INS. NEG. & COMP. LAw 292, 294
(1965):
Oftentimes an aggrieved person cannot be adequately recompensed unless the out-
rage of the wrongdoer's action and the embarrassment or mental anguish or loss of
face to the plaintiff are the foremost measures of damages. Without the prospect of
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Part One of this Note will review the historical background, ju-
risdiction, and scope of the FAA. Part Two will examine the Su-
preme Court's approach in evaluating the applicability of a state
procedural provision in arbitration. It will then analyze two recent
decisions which addressed the preemptability of a state substantive
provision with regard to an arbitrator's ability to award punitive
damages, and suggest that they fail to provide any certainty in
making such a determination. Finally, this Note will propose an
approach that courts may find useful when interpreting whether
an arbitration agreement permits an award of punitive damages.
I. SCOPE OF THE FAA
A. Background
The FAA was enacted to give arbitration agreements the same
legal effect as other contractual provisions. 9 When an award is
an award of damages measured in other than actual monetary loss or special dam-
age, there is small incentive for a plaintiff to invoke the law or force the wrongdoer
to make formal reparation in civil damages for his actions.
Id.: see also Melvin M. Belli, Punitive Damages: Their History, Their Use, and Their Worth in
Present-Day Society, 49 UMKC L. Rv:v. 1, 5-6 (1980) (punitive damages may serve public
justice).
A third motive cited by courts is compensation. See, e.g., Gagne v. Town of Enfield, 734
F.2d 902, 905 (2d Cir. 1984) (considering victim's attorney's fees element of punitive dam-
ages award). See generally Long, supra, at 870 (compensatory rationale for punitive
damages).
Finally, some courts have cited revenge as a motive. See, e.g., Roginsky v. Richardson-
Morrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 838 (2d Cir. 1967) (diverting plaintiffs desire for revenge into
peaceful channels was one of several rationales underlying punitive damages award).
Most American courts have demanded the necessary state of mind and actual or compen-
satory damages as prerequisites to any award of punitive damages. Kendall Yacht Corp. v.
United Cal. Bank, 50 Cal. App. 3d 949, 958 (1975) (punitive damages available where
defendant has acted with oppression, fraud, or malice-express or implied); Collens v. New
Canaan Water Co., 234 A.2d 825, 832 (Conn. 1967) (conscious disregard for safety of
others was necessary for punitive damages award); Engman v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
591 S.W.2d 78, 82 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (punitive damages available when defendant know-
ingly committed wrongful act without just cause or excuse): Borkowski v. Borkowski, 39
N.Y.2d 982, 983, 355 N.E.2d 287, 287, 387 N.Y.S.2d 233, 233 (1976) (prerequisite for
punitive damage award was gross, wanton, or willful fraud or other morally culpable con-
duct to degree sufficient to justify such award).
' See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). Section 2 of the FAA provides that arbitration agreements
"shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity from the revocation of any contract." Id. The 'savings clause' of Section 2 indicates
that "the purpose of Congress in 1925 was to make arbitration agreements as enforceable
as other contracts, but not more so." Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967): see also Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (FAA re-
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granted by an arbitrator, a court may not set it aside unless it can
be shown that the award involved fraud, corruption, undue
means, or that the arbitrator exceeded his power under the arbi-
tration agreement."0 Courts have construed these factors nar-
quires arbitration if agreement to arbitrate is part of contract evidencing interstate com-
merce, or if agreement is revocable upon such grounds as exist at law or equity for revoca-
tion of any contract); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. I, 2 (1984) (Congress declared
national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew power of states to resolve arbitration
agreements by making arbitration agreements valid and irrevocable): Seymour v. Gloria
Jean's Coffee Bean Franchising Corp., 732 F. Supp. 988, 991-92 (D. Minn. 1990) (FAA
intended to address traditional hostility of courts at common law towards arbitration as
well as remedy failure of state arbitration statutes to mandate enforcement of arbitration
agreements): supra notes I & 3 and accompanying text (discussing courts' hostility toward
arbitration agreements and Congress's response via FAA).
A party may challenge or seek enforcement of an arbitration award by a motion in dis-
trict court to stay litigation pending arbitration or to compel arbitration pursuant to sec-
tions 3 and 4 respectively. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4: see Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22 (1983) ("The Act provides two parallel devices for enforcing
an arbitration agreement: a stay of litigation in any case raising a dispute referable to arbi-
tration.... and an affirmative order to engage in arbitration." (citations omitted)); see also
Campeau Corp. v. May Dep't. Stores Co., 723 F. Supp. 224, 226-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(under FAA, stay pending arbitration is mandatory if it is shown that suit was commenced
on issue referable to arbitration under written agreement); Merrill Lynch, Inc. v. Me-
lamed, 405 So. 2d 790, 793 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (state courts required to stay judicial
proceedings upon showing that disputes are subject to valid and enforceable arbitration
agreements). See generally Zhaodong Jaing, Federal Arbitration Law and State Court Proceed-
ings, 23 Loy. L.A. L. RFv. 473, 502-18 (1991) (discussing sections 3 and 4 of Act): Arthur
S. Feldman, Note, Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ.: Confusing Federalism with Federal Policy Under the FAA, 69 TEx. L. REV. 691, 694
(1990) (same).
For sources discussing section 4 of the FAA, see Moses, 460 U.S. at 22 n.27 (explaining
section 4 of FAA): Avant Petroleum, Inc. v. Pecten Arabian Ltd., 696 F. Supp. 42, 44
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (to compel arbitration, court must determine whether controversy is cov-
ered by written arbitration agreement and petitioner is aggrieved by respondent's failure,
neglect, or refusal to arbitrate). See generally 9 U.S.C. § 4; Jaing, supra, at 502-18 (discuss-
ing section 4 of FAA): Feldman, supra, at 694 (same).
"o See 9 U.S.C. § 10(d). Section 10 of the FAA provides that judicial review of an arbitra-
tion award is limited to four possible situations:
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of
them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct . . . by which the rights of any
party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made.
(e) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required
the award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion, direct a re-
hearing by the arbitrators.
Id.
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rowly," and have required a showing that the arbitration award
was procured with a "manifest disregard for the law. 1 2
B. Jurisdictional Basis
Since Congress did not foresee the need to create an indepen-
dent basis of federal jurisdiction within the FAA, actions to en-
force arbitration agreements rely upon diversity of citizenship for
jurisdiction." The landmark case of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins t4
" See Van Waters & Rogers Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local Union 70,
913 F.2d 736, 739 (9th Cir. 1990). A reviewing court may not overturn an arbitrator's
decision merely because it disagrees with the arbitrator's factual findings, contract interpre-
tation, or choice of remedies. Id. As long as the arbitrator is acting within the scope of his
authority, the award must be upheld. Id.: see also Office of Supply, Gov't of Republic of
Korea v. New York Navigation Co., 469 F.2d 377, 379-80 (2d Cir. 1972) (review of arbi-
trator's award restricted in order to promote prompt and inexpensive resolution of dis-
putes): Saxis S.S. Co. v. Multifacs Int'l Traders, Inc., 375 F.2d 577, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1967)
(role of courts limited to ascertaining whether there are specific grounds for vacation of
award as provided in section 10 of FAA); Zeigler Coal Co. v. District 12, United Mine
Workers of America, 484 F. Supp. 445, 446-47 (C.D. III. 1980) (power to vacate arbitra-
tor's award severely restricted by FAA and by policy favoring resolution of grievances
through arbitration where parties have agreed to arbitrate); Shahmoon Indus., Inc. v.
United Steelworkers of America, 263 F. Supp. 10, 13-14 (D.N.J. 1966) (only where arbitra-
tor clearly goes beyond scope of grievance submitted will courts interfere); Local Union
560, I.B.T. v. Eazor Exp. Inc., 230 A.2d 521, 525 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1967) (review of arbitra-
tion awards extremely narrow).
"' See Carte Blanche Int'l, Ltd., 888 F.2d 260, 262 (2d Cir. 1989) ("manifest disregard of
the law" by arbitrators is judicially created ground for vacating arbitration awards, imply-
ing that arbitrator appreciates existence of clearly governing legal principle but decides to
ignore or pay no attention to it): Dundas Shipping & Trading Co. v. Stravelakis Bros., Ltd.,
508 F. Supp. 1000, 1003-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (court's power to vacate arbitrators' awards is
confined to grounds specified in FAA, and when award is in manifest disregard of law);
Marshall v. Coach House Restaurant, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 946, 952-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (may
vacate an award based on manifest disregard).
"s See Huffco Petroleum Corp. v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 681 F. Supp.
400, 401 (S.D. Tex. 1988) (no independent source of federal question subject matter juris-
diction under FAA); Hamilton Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Republican Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 291
F. Supp. 225, 232-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (FAA does not create independent basis for federal
jurisdiction; diversity of citizenship or federal question is required for federal jurisdiction),
aff d, 408 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1969); Local 1416, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Jostens, Inc.,
250 F. Supp. 496, 499 (D. Minn. 1966) (FAA does not furnish independent basis for fed-
eral jurisdiction).
At the time of its enactment, the FAA was considered to govern in federal cases based
on the view that Congress could create a "general federal common law." Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 n.13 (1967); see Feldman, supra note
9, at 693-94. In Swift v. Tyson, the Supreme Court ruled that the "laws of the several
states" did not include state judicial decisions, thus allowing federal courts to create gen-
eral federal common law for issues not governed by state statutes. 41 U.S. 1, 1 (1842),
overruled by Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), reh'g denied, 305 U.S. 673
(1938).
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held that state substantive law must be applied in federal diversity
actions. 15  Subsequently, in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of
America,'6 the Court held that enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments was a matter of substantive law.17 Thus, the FAA's enforce-
ment provisions were seriously jeopardized. 8
14 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
15 Id. at 73, 78-80. The Court based its decision on its finding that federal courts under
Swift v. Tyson had unconstitutionally usurped rights belonging to the states. Id.; see Joint
Hearings, supra note I, at 27. The FAA temporarily avoided the Erie challenge since, at the
time of its adoption, the FAA was viewed as procedural in nature. Id.; Committee on Com-
merce, Trade and Commercial Law, The United States Arbitration Law and its Application,
AB.A. J., March 1925, at 153, 156. A month after the FAA's enactment the A.B.A. draft-
ers wrote: "The statute establishes a procedure in the Federal Courts for the enforcement
of arbitration agreements .... A Federal statute providing for the enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements does relate solely to procedure in the Federal courts." Id.; see also South-
land Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 25-28 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (legislative his-
tory clearly shows Congress in 1925 viewed FAA as procedural); Julius Henry Cohen &
Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 275-276 (1926).
The Erie Court held that federal courts in diversity cases had to apply the substantive law
of the forum state, but federal procedural law should be used as long as it did not signifi-
cantly effect the outcome of the litigation. Id.
'6 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
" Id. at 203.
IS See, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin, 388 U.S. 395, 403 (1967). "[W]ith
respect to a matter within the jurisdiction of the federal courts save for the existence of an
arbitration clause, the federal court is instructed to order arbitration to proceed once it is
satisfied 'that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply [with
the arbitration agreement] is not in issue.' " Id. Since Congress enacted the FAA under the
view that it could create "general federal common law," it did not specify whether it was
acting under the authority to devise procedures for federal courts or to regulate interstate
commerce and the admiralty field. See infra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing
these two bases of authority in FAA). The power to regulate interstate and foreign com-
merce and to legislate in the admiralty and maritime fields is suggested in section 2 of the
FAA, which provides that a "written provision in any maritime transaction or contract...
involving commerce ... shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988)
(emphasis added). Commerce power is granted under Article 1, Section 8, of the Constitu-
tion. US. CoNsv. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. Article III grants the courts federal jurisdiction over
admiralty and maritime cases. U.S CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
The power to establish procedures for lower federal courts is suggested in section 4 of
the FAA. Section 4, authorizing the issuance of an order to compel arbitration, applies by
its terms only to "any United States district court." 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988). Congress's power
over federal court procedure derives from the power to establish the lower federal courts.
U.S. CoNsw. art. 1, § 8, art. III, § 1.
The Bernhardt decision eventually forced the Court to decide which basis of authority it
was acting under when it adopted the FAA. See infra notes 20-26 and accompanying text
(discussing how FAA is product of congressional intent to regulate maritime and interstate
commerce). Fen years after Bernhardt, the Court stated that Congress's reliance on the
" 'oft challenged' . . . [power to createl 'general law,' ...was only supplementary to the
admiralty and commerce powers, which formed the principal bases of the legislation."
Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 405 n.13 (quoting Erie, 304 U.S. at 69).
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In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,19 the
Supreme Court once again examined the jurisdiction of the FAA.
After careful review of the legislative history of the FAA,20 the
Court determined that the FAA was a product of Congress's
power to regulate maritime and interstate commerce,2 ' and up-
held the FAA's substantive role in federal diversity actions involv-
ing arbitration. 2  Fueled by the injection of Commerce Clause
'0 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
I0 d. at 405 n.13. The Court noted that one of the bill's sponsors in the House told his
colleagues that it "only affects contracts relating to interstate subjects and contracts in ad-
miralty." Id. (quoting 65 CONG. REc 1931 (1924)). The Senate Report on this legislation
similarly indicated that "the bill '[related] to maritime transactions and to contracts in in-
terstate and foreign commerce.' " Id. (quoting SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 3).
" Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 405. The Supreme Court stated that the question was not
whether Congress could create federal substantive rules to govern in diversity cases, but
"whether Congress Icouldl prescribe how federal courts are to conduct themselves with
respect to subject matter over which Congress plainly has power to legislate". Id. The
Court then stated that "it is clear beyond dispute that the federal arbitration statute is
based upon and confined to the incontestable federal foundations of 'control over inter-
state commerce and over admiralty.' " Id. (quoting HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at I).
Thus, the FAA was not merely a procedural device for the lower courts. Id. at 405; see
supra note 15 (discussing FAA as procedural mechanism).
2" See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 406. The Court noted that "[flederal courts [were] bound
to apply rules enacted by Congress with respect to matters--here, a contract involving com-
merce-over which it has legislative power." Id. However, once the Supreme Court gave
the FAA its national scope in Prima Paint, many states attempted to evade its ever-broaden-
ing scope by limiting arbitration to particular types of claims while reserving others for
judicial resolution. See, e.g., Collins Radio Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 467 F.2d 995, 997, 999
(8th Cir. 1972) (refusing to enforce Texas law which required advice and signature of law-
yer before agreement to arbitrate was valid): Wydel Assocs. v. Thermasol, Ltd., 452 F.
Supp. 739, 741-42 (W.D. Tex. 1978) (FAA applied and preempted state law which stated
that arbitration agreements were effective only when all members of partnership agreed).
Some state laws were hostile to arbitration agreements. For instance, a recently repealed
Texas arbitration statute rendered any contract voidable at will if it failed to feature the
arbitration agreement itself in capital letters. See Act ofJune 13, 1979, 66th Leg., R.S., ch.
704, § 2, 1979 TEX. GEN. LAWS 1708, repealed by Act of June 18, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch.
817, 1987 TEX. GEN. LAWS 2828 (effective Aug. 31, 1987).
Some state courts devised common-law doctrines making enforcement difficult, creating
rules which required judicial resolution of all charges of fraud. See, e.g., George Engine Co.
v. Southern Shipbuilding Corp., 350 So. 2d 881, 884 (La. 1977) ("The arbitration law and
arbitration clauses in contracts do not vest in arbitrators the historic jurisdiction of the
courts to determine fraud .... "); West Fargo Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. West Fargo Educ.
Ass'n, 259 N.W.2d 612, 616 (N.D. 1977) (absent fraud or deception, agreement to submit
certain disputes to binding arbitration is valid).
More specifically, some states exempt claims for punitive damages from arbitration. Gar-
rity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 356, 353 N.E.2d 793, 795, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831, 833
(1976) (state law prohibits arbitrators from awarding punitive damages). For other exam-
ples of states that exempt certain claims from arbitration or place limits on arbitration, see
e.g., Litton RCS, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 376 F. Supp. 579, 588 (E.D. Pa.
1974) (limiting state's authority to prohibit public instrumentality from entering into arbi-
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power into the FAA, the Court decided Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,23 which provided a rule of
construction: any doubt as to whether parties to a contract in-
tended to include or exclude matters that were potentially arbitra-
ble was to be resolved in favor of arbitration.2"
The broad scope of the FAA was confirmed in Southland Corp.
v. Keating, 6 where the Supreme Court held that the FAA was a
body of federal substantive law which must be applied in both
state and federal courts." After Southland it was clear that state
tration agreement).
In federal causes of action, the Supreme Court has deemed most claims arbitrable under
the FAA as a response to the many attempts by litigants to avoid arbitration. Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989) (alleged violations of
both the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were -arbitrable
under FAA); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 234, 242
(1987) (claims under RICO and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were arbitrable under
FAA). In addition, the Supreme Court considers the FAA to "mandate[ I enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate statutory claims" absent an explicit federal prohibition against the
claim at issue. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226.
" 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
24 Id. at 24. The Court cited the "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agree-
ments." Id. Many appellate courts, prior to Moses H. Cone, had already begun to base their
decisions on the broad policy favoring arbitration expressed in the Prima Paint decision.
Id.: see, e.g., Wick v. Atlantic Marine, 605 F.2d 166, 168 & n.4 (5th Cir. 1979) (noting that
court should stay proceedings for arbitrable claims); Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585,
598 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (favoring arbitration of disputes on failure of amicable settlements);
Controlled Sanitation Corp. v. District 128 of Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Work-
ers, 524 F.2d 1324, 1328 (3d Cir. 1975) (ruling damage claim susceptible to arbitration),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 915 (1976); Avecedo Maldonado v. PPG Indus., 514 F.2d 614, 616
(1st Cir. 1975) (describing coverage of broad arbitration language in contract): Hirshman,
supra note 3, at 1331 & n.149 (citing Dickinson v. Heinhold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 643
(7th Cir. 1981).
The Moses H. Cone Court noted several issues it viewed as arbitrable: "construction of the
contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability."
460 U.S. at 25.
26 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
2I Id. at 12. Arbitration is a question of substantive federal law applicable in state and
federal courts. Id. The Southland Court relied largely upon legislative history to support its
conclusion that Congress intended the FAA to apply to both state and federal courts. Id. at
13-14. The Court specifically quoted H.R. Rep. No. 96, which suggested that " '[the pur-
pose of this bill is to make valid and enforceable [sic] agreements for arbitration contained
in contracts involving interstate commerce or within the jurisdiction or [sic] admiralty, or which
may be the subject of litigation in the Federal courts.' " Id. at 12, 13 (quoting HousE RE-
PORT, supra note 3, at 1); see also Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219
(1985) (legislative history established that purpose behind FAA was to ensure enforcement
of agreements to arbitrate). Thus, the Southland Court held that the FAA was "based upon
• . . the incontestable federal foundations of 'control over interstate commerce and over
admiralty.' " Southland, 465 U.S. at 1 (quoting Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 405 (quoting
HousE REPORr, supra note 3, at 1)).
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laws which conflicted with the FAA would be preempted.2 7
II. PREEMPTION
A. Preemption of State Procedural Provisions: Volt Information Sci-
ences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
University
Although it recognized the broad preemptive power accorded
the FAA, the Supreme Court seemed to refine its scope in Volt
Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jun-
ior University. 8 Volt Information Sciences, Inc. ("Volt") and Stan-
The Southland Court also stated that Congress, in enacting the FAA, wanted to over-
come the reluctance of state courts to enforce arbitration agreements. Southland, 465 U.S.
at 13: see supra notes 2 & 3 (discussing judicial hostility towards arbitration and Congress's
purpose in enacting FAA). The Court further concluded that "[in creating a substantive
rule applicable in state as well as federal courts, Congress intended to foreclose state legis-
lative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements." Southland, 465
U.S. at 16 (footnotes omitted).
In her dissent, Justice 0' Connor stated that Southland was the first case in which the
Court had the opportunity to determine whether the FAA applied to state court proceed-
ings. Id. at 24. She maintained that the statement in Moses H. Cone, which said the FAA was
applicable in state courts, was merely dicta since the case involved a federal, not state,
proceeding. Id.
"T See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489-90 (1987). The preemptive scope accorded
the FAA in Southland was reinforced by the Supreme Court's decision in Perry, which
quoted Southland extensively in supporting its determination. Id. at 489-90. The Court
added to the Southland decision by outlining the proper approach to normative state law
under the FAA. Id. at 492 n.9. It noted that "state law, whether of legislative or judicial
origin, is applicable if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability,
and enforceability of contracts generally." Id. However, the Court stated that "[a] state-law
principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at
issue does not comport with [the Savings Clause] requirement of section 2." Id. The Court
further explained that "[a) court may not construe an arbitration agreement in a manner
different from that in which it otherwise construes nonarbitration agreements under state
law." Id. But see Barbara Ann Atwood, Issues in Federal-State Relations Under the Federal
Arbitration Act, 37 U. FLA. L. REv. 61, 83-89 (1985) (criticizing Southland's approach to
issue of preemption).
8 489 U.S. 468 (1989). Prior to Volt, a number of cases involving an arbitrator's award
of punitive damages echoed the "substantive" effect the FAA had in preventing state law
from quashing such an award. See, e.g., Willis v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 569 F.
Supp. 821, 824-25 (M.D.N.C. 1983). The United States District Court for the Middle Dis-
trict of North Carolina granted a brokerage firm's motion to stay court proceedings pend-
ing arbitration of a customer's claims of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 825. The
court held that since the parties' contract evidenced a transaction in interstate commerce,
section 3 of the FAA compelled a stay of the court action. Id. at 823. Additionally, the
court discounted the customer's claim that the contract's New York choice-of-law provision
would negate the chances of recovering punitive damages if the contract were subject to
arbitration: "If an issue is arbitrable under federal law, it remains so despite contrary state
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ford Junior University ("Stanford") entered into a contract which
provided that all disputes arising out of, or relating to, the con-
tract or its breach would be arbitrated.2 9 The parties.also agreed
to a choice-of-law provision which stated that the contract would
be "governed by the law of the place where the project is
located."30
After a dispute arose during the performance of the contract,
Volt made a demand for arbitration." Stanford sought indemnity
from third parties,32 and made a motion to stay arbitration pursu-
ant to Section 1281.2(c) of California's Code of Civil Procedure."
According to the California rule, a court could stay arbitration
pending resolution of a dispute between a party to an arbitration
agreement and a third party, if there were "a possibility of con-
law." Id. at 824. The court further noted that "'[t]he broad arbitration provision includes
claims for punitive damages. Hence, the parties by their contract have authorized any arbi-
trator who may hear this matter to award punitive damages." Id. Under New York state
substantive law, an arbitrator is not permitted to award punitive damages. Garrity v. Lyle
Stuart, 40 N.Y.2d 354, 355, 353 N.E.2d 793, 794, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831, 832 (1976).
The Eleventh Circuit reiterated the Willis court's expansive application of the FAA, and
extended it to permit an arbitrator's award of punitive damages where the contract itself
had not expressly included such an award. Willoughby v. Kajima Int'l, 776 F.2d 269, 270
(IIth Cir. 1985). The lower court had stated: "When the extremely broad arbitration
clause is read in light of the equally broad grant of remedial power in Rule 43 [of the
AAAJ, it is clear that the parties by the contract have authorized the arbitrators to award
punitive damages." Willoughby, 598 F. Supp. 353, 357 (N.D. Ala. 1984). Where the arbitra-
tion clause incorporated provisions of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"),
which permits an arbitrator to grant any remedy that is just and equitable, strong federal
policy authorized an award of punitive damages. Id. at 355; see AMERICAN ARBITRATION
Assoc. R. 43 (providing for arbitration panel's award of "any remedy or relief which is just
and equitable and within terms of the agreements of the parties.").
The decision in Willoughby was later affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit in Bonar v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, which held that a choice-of-law provision in a contract governed by the
FAA merely designated the substantive law which arbitrators must apply in deciding
whether the conduct in issue merited an award of punitive damages; it did not deprive the
arbitrators of their authority to award punitive damages. 835 F.2d 1378, 1387 (1 1th Cir.
1988). As such, a New York choice-of-law provision which raised the specter of the Garrity
rule did not deprive the arbitrators of their power to award punitive damages. Id.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida similarly held that
the FAA evinced a desire to create a national policy favoring arbitration of punitive dam-
ages claims, regardless of a New York choice-of-law provision. Singer v. E.F. Hutton & Co.,
699 F. Supp. 276, 279 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
29 Volt, 489 U.S. at 470.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 471.
32 Id.
3 Id.
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flicting rulings on a common rule of law or fact." 34
The Superior Court denied Volt's motion to compel arbitra-
tion. 0 On appeal, the California Court of Appeals affirmed, 36 not-
ing that although the FAA governed the parties' contract, it did
not contain a provision similar to the California provision.37 The
court held that the provision which stated that arbitration would
be governed by "the place where the project is located" was in-
tended by the parties to incorporate local arbitration rules. In
construing this provision, the court rejected any arguments of
preemption by the FAA." Although the California Supreme
Court denied Volt's petition for discretionary review, 9 the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue pur-
suant to its appellate jurisdiction.40
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that the
FAA did not preempt the California procedural law. " The Court
recognized that in applying state-law principles of contract inter-
pretation to an arbitration agreement, due regard must be given
to the federal policy favoring arbitration. 42 Nonetheless, the
Court held that the FAA did not seek to enforce arbitration
under all circumstances.43 Noting additionally that the FAA did
not contain an express preemptive provision nor did it indicate
any congressional intent to occupy the entire field," the Court up-
held application of the California procedural rule stating, "we
give effect to the contractual rights and expectations of the parties
34 Volt, 498 U.S. at 471 n.3 (quoting CAL CIv. PROC COnE § 1281.2(c) (West 1982)).
35 Id. at 471.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 471-72.
" Id. at 472.
39 Volt, 489 U.S. at 473.
40 Id. at 472.
" Id. at 477-78. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2), the Court had appellate jurisdiction to
review a final judgment rendered by the highest court of a state in which a decision could
be had "[wjhen . . . the validity of a statute of any state [is drawn into question] on the
ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States,
and the decision is in favor of its validity." Id.
" Id. at 478. The Supreme Court noted that the purpose of the FAA was to overrule
the judiciary's longstanding refusal to enforce arbitration agreements. Id. at 478; see supra
notes I & 3 (discussing hostility of courts towards arbitration).
4 3
'Volt, 489 U.S. at 477-78.
14 Id. at 477.
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without doing violence to the FAA policies."'48
B. Preemption of State Substantive Provisions
Although Volt set forth a definitive approach in evaluating the
preemptability of state procedural provisions in arbitration, no
such clarity exists regarding a state substantive provision." This
lack of guidance has resulted in a split among the circuits in the
area of punitive damages awards.
1. Fahnestock & Co. v. Waltman-Punitive Damages Award
Vacated
In Fahnestock & Co. v. Waltman,4 the Second Circuit examined
the validity of an arbitrator's award of punitive damages under
the FAA.48 Fahnestock & Co. ("Fahnestock") was a brokerage
firm which challenged the validity of an arbitration award of puni-
tive damages pursuant to a New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE")
proceeding.4 9 The district court vacated the punitive damages
portion of the award, and stated that arbitrators were prohibited
from awarding punitive damages under state law.5 0 On appeal, the
Second Circuit held that the award of punitive damages was prop-
erly vacated pursuant to New York's rule in Garrity v. Lyle Stuart,
Inc.8 1 In Garrity, the New York Court of Appeals held that "[an
arbitrator has no power to award punitive damages, even if
agreed upon by the parties. '8 2 Noting that state law may be pre-
empted in federal diversity cases "to the extent that it actually
11 Id. at 479.
461 See discussion infra parts ll.B, 111 (relevant circuit court cases illustrating uncertainty
with respect to preemption of state substantive law).
' 935 F.2d 512 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 380 (1991).
48 Id. at 514.
" Id. at 515.
so Id.
51 40"N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1976). See generally G. Richard
Shell, The Power to Punish: Authority of Arbitrators to Award Multiple Damages and Attorneys'
Fees, 72 MASS. L. REV. 26, 33-35 (1987) (discussing Garrity rule); Note, Arbitration: The
Award of Punitive Damages as a Public Policy Question, 43 BRooK. L. REV. 546, 550 (1976)
(same). But see Belko v. Avx Corp., 251 Cal. Rptr. 557, 566-67 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (award-
ing punitive damages where expressly provided for in arbitration agreement).
8" Garrity, 40 N.Y.2d at 356, 353 N.E.2d at 794, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
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conflicts with federal law," 8 and that the FAA neither contained
an express, preemptive provision nor a congressional intent to
pervasively occupy the field of arbitration, the Second Circuit up-
held the Garrity rule. 4
Judge Miner, writing for the majority, noted that the agree-
ment between the parties did not expressly give the arbitrator
power to award punitive damages."8 The court stated that had
such a provision been included, the FAA might have required
confirmation of the award since it provides for arbitration agree-
ments to be enforced according to their terms. 6 The court fur-
ther added that a similar result would have occurred if the provi-
sion had incorporated the American Arbitration Association's
("AAA") Commercial Arbitration Rules which provide that "[a]n
arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief which the [a]rbitrator
deems just and equitable within the scope of the agreement of the
parties."8 7 This language, observed Judge Miner, would probably
be broad enough to allow such an award, although the issue was
not specifically before them.58 Turning to the parties' agreement
which incorporated the governing arbitration provisions of the
NYSE Constitution, the court stated that since the NYSE rules
were silent as to the ability of an arbitrator to award punitive
damages, the Garrity rule did not conflict with the agreement of
the parties, and therefore the FAA did not preempt the NYSE
"' Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 517 (emphasis added); see Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941) (preemption is found in cases where state law "stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress"); see also Flight
Sys. v. Paul A. Laurence Co., 715 F. Supp. 1125, 1127 (D.D.C. 1989) (interpreting Volt to
mean all choice-of-law provisions enforceable as long as consistent with FAA); Batton v.
Green, 801 S.W.2d 923, 927 (Tex. 1990) (state law only preempted to extent it conflicts
with objectives of Congress); cf Saturn Distribution Corp. v. Williams, 905 F.2d 719, 722
,n.2 (4th Cir. 1990) (interpreting Volt as holding that state law will not be preempted if it
addresses concerns that FAA does not). See generally Jiang, supra note 9, at 473 (discussing
choice-of-law provision impact on applicability of FAA).
"' Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 518-19: see infra note 79 and accompanying text (detailing
applicable NYSE arbitration rules).
Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 517.
"Id.
Id. at 519 (citing Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1386 (11 th Cir.
1988)): see Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys., Inc., 882 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1989)
(upholding AAA award of punitive damages).
" Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 519.
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rules."
2. Cunard Line, Ltd. v. Todd Shipyards, Inc.-Punitive Damages
Award Confirmed
In a decision rendered contemporaneously with Fahnestock, the
Ninth Circuit addressed the validity of an arbitrator's award of
punitive damages in Cunard Line, Ltd. v. Todd Shipyards, Inc." In
Cunard, a dispute arose between a contractor and a cruise line in
the course of performance of their contract, after which the con-
tractor filed a demand for arbitration." The contract between the
parties, which incorporated the AAA Rules and contained a New
York choice-of-law provision, provided that any dispute would be
referred to arbitration."' Ultimately, the contractor was awarded
one million dollars in punitive damages."
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the arbitration panel
properly awarded punitive damages based on the broad view of
the power of arbitrators to settle disputes," coupled with the in-
corporation of the AAA's Commercial Arbitration Rules.""
Adopting the Supreme Court's view that the FAA governs arbi-
tration matters in state and federal courts,"' the court rejected the
argument that where parties incorporate a choice-of-law provi-
sion, state law would necessarily apply in every instance. 67 Dis-
agreeing with the Fahnestock decision, the Cunard court instead
held that despite the choice-of-law provision in the Todd-Cunard
contract, New York's Garrity rule was preempted by federal law."8
5* Id. at 517.
60 943 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1991).
6e Id. at 1059.
"' Id. Section 21 of the contract stated, "[a]ny and every dispute, difference or question
between the parties hereto which shall at anytime arise after the execution of this Agree-
ment . . . relating to this Agreement, shall be referred to arbitration." Id. at 1060.
I ld. at 1061. The award was later confirmed by the district court. Id.
Id. at 1063.
Cunard, 943 F.2d at 1063. The court relied on the fact that two other federal courts
had permitted arbitrators to award punitive damages where application of this rule was
coupled with a broad arbitration agreement. Id.
"Id.
67 Id. at 1062.
" Id. at 1063.
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III. PROPOSAL: A CLOSER EXAMINATION OF THE PARTIES' INTENT
It is submitted that although Volt is clear as to the applicability
of state arbitration procedural provisions which do not conflict
with the FAA, no such edict has been issued with regard to similar
substantive state provisions. In the wake of this uncertainty, courts
have taken divergent paths in assessing the weight to be accorded
such provisions, which is apparent in the foregoing decisions of
the Second" and Ninth 70 Circuits with respect to the application
of the Garrity rule.
Despite the contradictory results reached by these circuits, one
thing is clear from Volt: the parties' intent is the pivotal factor in
resolving this issue. As such, the ensuing portion of this Note will
suggest an approach to determine whether the FAA preempts a
state substantive provision.
A. Express Agreement
Arbitration under the FAA is truly consensual in nature.7
Since parties are generally free to structure their agreements as
they see fit,7" it is suggested that courts should closely examine the
69 See supra notes 46-59 and accompanying text (detailing vacatur of punitive damages
award in Fahnestock pursuant to state substantive ban on power of arbitrators to make such
awards).
In Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., the lower court upheld an arbitration panel's
award of punitive damages despite the presence of a New York choice-of-law provision:
"JA] choice-of-law provision in a contract governed by the [Federall Arbitration Act
merely designates the substantive law that the arbitrators must apply in determining
whether the conduct of the parties warrants an award of punitive damages: it does not
deprive the arbitrators of their authority to award punitive damages." 752 F. Supp. 151,
154 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). However, the Second Circuit reversed, relying on their opinion in
Fahnestock, and held that the parties' inclusion of a New York choice-of-law provision evi-
denced an intent to be bound by the Garrity rule. Barbier, 948 F.2d 117, 121-23 (2d Cir.
1991).
" See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text (punitive damages award upheld in
Cunard despite presence of New York choice-of-law provision).
"' See supra notes I & 2 and accompanying text (reviewing FAA and its formative history
as founded upon enforcement of privately negotiated arbitration agreements).
"' See Fahnestock & Co. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 518 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
380 (1991). "If the parties had agreed to permit the arbitrators to make such an award,
federal arbitration law might require confirmation, for 'parties are generally free to struc-
ture their arbitration agreements as they see fit,' and the FAA provides for the enforce-
ment of the terms of such privately negotiated agreements." Id. (quoting Volt Information
Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478-79
(1989)): see also Complete Interiors, Inc. v. Behan, 558 So. 2d 48, 51 (Fla. 1990) (punitive
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intent of the parties as the primary means of effectuating their
agreement. If the parties in Fahnestock and Cunard had expressly
agreed in their contracts to award or preclude an award of puni-
tive damages upon arbitration of a dispute, most courts would
agree that the award should be upheld. 3 A contrary ruling would
be inimical to the FAA's mandate that courts enforce such agree-
ments in accordance with their terms.7 Furthermore, it is as-
serted that even where the parties' choice-of-law provision, e.g.,
New York, may foreclose an award of punitive damages by virtue
of state law, e.g., the Garrity rule, the express agreement would
clearly outweigh any contrary inference drawn from incorpora-
tion of state law.
B. Extrinsic Evidence
In the absence of an express provision, courts should then focus
on extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties when
deciding whether to incorporate a substantive state provision into
their agreement." For instance, if an arbitration agreement uti-
lized broad or indefinite language in describing the powers of an
arbitrator, an award of punitive damages by an arbitrator would
damages should not be awarded absent express provision authorizing such relief in arbitra-
tion agreement); cf C. Evan Stewart, Punitive Damages Arbitration: Fish or Cut Bait, N.YL.J,
Feb. 21, 1991, at 5, col. 1. To secure protection from an arbitrator's award of punitive
damages pending clarification of the law, Mr. Stewart suggests that arbitration agreements
be drafted so as to: (1) state specifically that New York substantive and procedural law are
to govern the proceeding; and (2) state that the application of New York law will be to the
exclusion of any other state's law and federal law, except where federal law is in direct
conflict. Id. See generally Douglas R. Davis, Overextension of Arbitral Authority: Punitive Dam-
ages and Issues of Arbitrability-Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Systems, Inc., 882
F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1989), 65 WASH. L. REV. 695, 712 (1990) (nontraditional contractual rem-
edy should not be allowed in arbitration absent express provision).
7" See Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 518 ("If the parties had agreed to permit the arbitrators to
make such an award, federal arbitration law might require confirmation."); Cunard Line,
Ltd., v. Todd Shipyards Inc., 943 F.2d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 1991) (arbitrators may award
punitive damages when given authority which may arise impliedly via extrinsic evidence).
" See Volt, 489 U.S. at 472 (goal of FAA is to enforce terms of privately negotiated
agreements).
"' See Schering Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1983). Where the con-
tract language is not entirely unambiguous, parties have a right to present extrinsic evi-
dence of their intent at the time of contracting. Id. But see Burger King Corp. v. Horn &
Hardart Co., 893 F.2d 525, 527 (2d Cir. 1990) (if unambiguous, court must enforce provi-
sion as clearly written); American Home Prod. Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 748 F.2d
760, 765 (2d Cir. 1984) (same).
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be in harmony with the federal policy favoring arbitration, and
would ensure that any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable
issues be resolved in favor of arbitration."
Where the parties have expressly incorporated the Commercial
Rules of the AAA, which broadly provide for "any remedy or re-
lief which the arbitrator deems just and equitable within the scope
of the agreement of the parties," courts should evaluate it as com-
pelling evidence of the parties' intent not to foreclose any reme-
dial measure-including punitive damages." This was part of the
Cunard court's rationale in upholding the arbitration panel's au-
thority to award punitive damages.76
Similarly, when arbitration involves a dispute pursuant to the
rules of the NYSE,7 9 the fact that the award form includes a space
marked "punitive damages" could be considered strong extrinsic
evidence of the parties' intent, and warrant an award of punitive
damages.8" It should be noted, however, that the majority in Fah-
"' See supra note 28 and accompanying text (federal policy in favor of broad view of
arbitrability supports arbitrator's power to award punitive damages); see also Mitsubishi Mo-
tors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985) (pursuant to FAA,
"as with any other contract, the parties' intentions control, but those intentions are gener-
ously construed as to issues of arbitrability").
" See Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys., Inc., 882 F.2d 6, 11 n.5 (lst Cir. 1989);
Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1387-88 (11th Cir. 1988); Wil-
loughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, 598 F. Supp. 353, 357 (N.D. Ala. 1984),
affd, 776 F.2d 269 (1 th Cir. 1985). But see generally Davis, supra note 72, at 704-12 (criti-
cizing Raytheon decision as overextending arbitral authority).
"S See Cunard Line, Ltd. v. Todd Shipyards, Inc., 943 F.2d 1056, 1063 (9th Cir. 1991).
" See 2 N.Y.SE. Guide (CCH) 1 2347. Rule 347 provides that:
Any controversy between a registered representative and any member or member
organization arising out of the employment or termination of employment of such
registered representative by and with such member or member organization shall be
settled by arbitration, at the instance of any such party, in accordance with the arbi-
tration procedure prescribed elsewhere in these rules.
Id. Rule 600(a) states that "[any dispute, claim or controversy between .. .a member ...
and/or associated person arising in connection with the business of such member .. .and/
or associated person in connection with his activities as an associated person shall be arbi-
trated under the Constitution and Rules of the New York Stock Exchange . Id.
2600.
" See Fahnestock & Co. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 521 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
380 (1991) (Mahoney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Mahoney indi-
cated that such evidence could have been more helpful if the district court had given it
proper consideration. Id.; Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 752 F. Supp. 151,
160 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), affd in part, rev'd in part, 948 F.2d 117 (1991). In Barbier, the court
stated that "laIlthough the NYSE rules do not address the issue of punitive awards, the
NYSE award form utilized by the exchange explicitly provides for awards of punitive dam-
ages. This suggests that the arbitration body chosen by the parties contemplates punitive
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nestock stated that such award forms were not part of the arbitra-
tion agreement and had no bearing on the issue of an arbitrator's
power to award punitive damages."
Ultimately, it is suggested that the use ofextrinsic evidence by
courts to determine the intent of the parties where there is no
express agreement as to an award of punitive damages becomes a
weighing process. It is further suggested that this process becomes
more difficult when there is a choice-of-law provision effectively
incorporating a conflicting state provision such as the Garrity rule.
The outcome in such an instance is clearly dependent on the
strength of the extrinsic evidence contradicting its incorporation,
and, it is asserted that an AAA agreement is the strongest of such
evidence."
C. Absence of Express Agreement or Extrinsic Evidence
In those instances where there is neither an express agreement
nor extrinsic evidence indicating the parties' intent to permit an
award of punitive damages, one court has suggested that "in light
of the federal policy, any doubts concerning the scope of the arbi-
tral issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration." 83 In that
decision, an award of punitive damages was upheld despite the
Garrity rule." It is submitted this holding was flawed by its simple
invocation of pre-Volt authority.88
Instead, it is suggested that at such an impasse, courts should
preliminarily recognize the state substantive provision, i.e., Garrity
rule, as a "gap-filler" 86 in the parties' agreement-and use it to fill
awards where warranted by applicable law." Id.
8' See Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 519 ("We cannot conclude that award forms are part of
the arbitration agreement.").
"' See supra note 74 (choice-of-law provision is nondeterminative on question of punitive
damages). But see Henry v. Alcove Investment, 284 Cal. Rptr. 255, 259 (1991) (choice-of-
law provision makes contract arbitrable under state law rather than FAA): Albright v. Ed-
ward D. Jones & Co., 571 N.E.2d 1329, 1332-33 (Ind. 1991) (citing Volt as holding that
where parties agreed state law would govern, FAA would not preempt).
8 Barbier, 752 F. Supp. at 157 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)).
" Id. at 160.
" See supra note 28 (discussing pre-Volt cases dealing with effects of choice-of-law provi-
sion on punitive damages award).
" See Feldman, supra note 9, at 695 (author labels as "gap filling" those areas where
states can provide procedures to enforce arbitration agreements when FAA does not).
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a gap or area, i.e., punitive damages, not dealt with specifically by
the parties' agreement or the FAA.87 It is asserted that despite a
designation of New York's Garrity rule as a "gap-filler," further
inquiry must be made to ensure its consistency with the underly-
ing goals and policies of the FAA. Only then should the state sub-
stantive provision be incorporated into the parties' agreement. 8
In Garrity, the New York Court of Appeals asserted that a pro-
hibition on punitive damages awards in arbitration was necessary
for several reasons.8 9 Most importantly, the court noted that such
awards displaced the state "as the engine for imposing a social
sanction," and therefore warranted judicial interference. 90 Ironi-
cally, the court's rationale was almost identical to those espoused
by "hostile" courts unwilling to enforce arbitration agreements,
which in part prompted the enactment of the FAA in 1925.91 It is
submitted that the Garrity rationale is inconsistent with the FAA
policies, and therefore should be preempted.
Similarly, although it was unnecessary for the Cunard court to
proceed to the final portion of this analysis, since it held that the
available extrinsic evidence evinced a willingness by the parties to
include punitive damages in their agreement, it is asserted that
such a determination effectively highlights the incorrect result
reached by the Fahnestock court. Although the Fahnestock court
proceeded correctly in incorporating the gap-filler in the absence
of an express agreement or credible extrinsic evidence to the con-
trary, it failed to take the analysis one step further and evaluate
81 Id.
' See Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jun-
ior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989) (quoting in part, Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941)). "But even when Congress has not completely displaced state regulation in an area,
state law may nonetheless be preempted to the extent that it 'stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.' " Id.
81 Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 358-60, 353 N.E.2d 793, 795-96, 386
N.Y.S.2d 831, 833-35 (1976). The New York Court of Appeals believed such an intrusion
into arbitration proceedings was well supported for several reasons: (1) punitive damages
are generally not available for mere breach of contract: (2) such an award displaces the
State "as the engine for imposing a social sanction," thus warranting judicial interference
on a policy matter of such significance; and finally, (3) awards of punitive damages under-
mine the ultimate usefulness of arbitration. Id.
90 Id. at 358, 353 N.E.2d at 796, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
" See supra notes I & 3 and accompanying text (explaining judicial hostility to arbitra-
tion agreements).
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the substantive state provision in light of the goals and policies of
the FAA.
CONCLUSION
The FAA mandates that state and federal courts enforce arbi-
tration agreements in accordance with their terms in an effort to
make such agreements as enforceable as other contracts. Mean-
while, states have taken the liberty to create procedural as well as
substantive provisions in the absence of any clear designation of
the FAA's preemptive scope. Although the Supreme Court has
since defined such boundaries with regard to procedural matters,
the effect to be accorded substantive provisions remains unsettled.
Until Congress or the Supreme Court definitively resolves this di-
lemma, parties should draft their contracts carefully. They should
bear in mind the foregoing analysis when contemplating an arbi-
tration agreement and draft it accordingly. In doing so, parties
will be secure in the knowlege that their intent alone governs the
interpretation of their agreement, while insuring that the FAA re-
mains true to its original purpose.
Joseph P. Lakatos & Thomas G. Stenson
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